JEFFERSON ON JUDICIAL REVIEW: CONSISTENCY THROUGH CHANGE
WALLACE MENDELSONt

ECENT AMERICAN history suggests that the "liberal"

attitude toward

judicial review varies with the relative "liberalism" of the Supreme
Court. When in the years just prior to 1937 the Court was generally
more conservative than the legislative branches of government, "liberals"
found judicial review quite undemocratic. More recently-and particularly
since the School Segregation Cases'--"liberals" have found judicial review a
useful adjunct to democracy. 2 Conversely, of course, the "conservative" view
of the Court has shifted from veneration to distrust. Thomas Jefferson's attitude toward the judiciary seems to have been similarly flexible, though his "inconsistency" is better explained not in terms of the comparative "liberalism"
of the various agencies of government, but in terms of their changing, relative
tendencies towards "tyranny." Finding that Jefferson was at first more hospitable toward judicial review than he was later on, Dumas Malone offers this
explanation:
he generally opposed such tyrannies as seemed most menacing at a particular time.... [At first] the danger of judicial supremacy was exceedingly
remote. Also, the American government was heavily overbalanced on the
side of the states, and neither here nor elsewhere in this period of constitutional discussion did he appear as a notable champion of the latter.
The dangers of the new system [a Federalist judiciary headed by John
Marshall] which impressed him most, when he finally learned just what it
3
was to be, were those relating to the liberty of individuals.
Mr. Malone does not spell out the details of the alleged Jeffersonian
switch. A recent critic argues that there was no switch; that Jefferson consistently rejected judicial review, and steadfastly supported what may be
called "concurrent review." 4 The latter contemplates that each of the three
branches of government "is truly independent of the others, and has an
equal right to decide for itself what is the meaning of the Constitution in
the cases submitted to its action ...."5 The present thesis is that while Jefferson
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2 See Roche, Book Review, 2 MAss. REV. 573 (1961).
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undoubtedly advocated concurrent review after 1800, earlier he favored a
far more important role for the judiciary.
In his famous Notes on Virginia (1782), Jefferson examined his state's
government and found it wanting, particularly in that its constitution (1776)
was only a legislative act and as such alterable by legislation. 6 Thus, in his
view there was "no legal obstacle to the assumption by the assembly of all
the powers legislative, executive, and judiciary....7 In 1783 he proposed
a new constitution to be adopted by a constitutional convention whose
product would be supreme vis-k-vis ordinary legislation-the new document
to contain the following provision: "The General Assembly shall not have
power to infringe this constitution ....
'8 To enforce this, i.e., to provide
a safeguard against legislative tyranny of the kind that he feared under the
existing constitution, he provided a "legal obstacle." This was a special
Council of Revision made up of representatives of the executive and judicial
branches, and armed with the power to veto legislation.9 Obviously in this
era Jefferson was not satisfied to let a simple legislative majority enjoy the
freedom from an outside, over-ruling power that concurrent review, contemplates.
In 1784 he listed the "rational and necessary" objects for the attainment
of which he had "long wished to see a [state constitutional] convention called."
Among the objects listed was "making our constitution paramount [vis-&-vis]
...the ordinary legislature so that all acts contradictory to it may be adjudged
null....S"o
By 1786 he seemed to consider judicial review an accepted principle
throughout the country: "I have not heard that in the other states they have
ever infringed their constitutions; and I suppose they have not done it;
as the judges would consider any law as void, which was contrary to the constitution."i Shortly thereafter in 1787 he wrote Madison with respect to the
proposed Constitution of the United States: "I like the negative [veto]
given to the Executive, conjointly with a third of either House; though
I should have liked it better, had the judiciary been associated for that purpose,
62 Id. at 1, 165-74.

7Id. at 173.
8Jefferson's Draft of a Constitution for Virginia (1783), 6 Tim
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JEFrmON 294, 298 (Boyd ed. 1952).

9Id.
at 302-03.
10 Letter to Pendleton, May 25, 1784, 7 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFrnsON 292, 293

(Boyd ed. 1952). (Emphasis added.) As Mr. Krislov recognizes, supranote 4, at 121, concurrent review contemplates that a court may refuse to enforce a measure which it deems
unconstitutional. Unlike judicial review, this does not mean that the court may invalidate
the measure, i.e., adjudge it null and void.
11 Letter to Demeunier, Jan. 24, 1786, 10 THE WnriTNGs OF THOMAS JEFFERsoN 11, 18
(Bergh ed. 1904).
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or invested separately with a similar power."12 Obviously Jefferson wanted
the judiciary to have some part in a veto, or "legal obstacle," against legislative tyranny-whether it was the council-of-revision type, or a separate
judicial veto, did not seem to matter. Obviously, too, at this juncture Jefferson
thought the judiciary was to have no veto power at all either "conjointly"
or "separately"-otherwise he would not have written that "he should have
liked it better," if the Constitution had provided for one or the other.
Shortly thereafter in The Federalist, No. 78, Hamilton demonstrated
that a judicial veto (judicial review) was implicit in the Constitution. Indeed
the views thus expressed are reflected in large part in Marbury v. Madison.13
Then evidently accepting Hamilton's position,14 though of course he may have
come upon it elsewhere, Jefferson reversed himself by recognizing the existence
of a judicial veto-which he endorsed in rather lyrical terms. Writing Madison
in 1789 about the proposed Bill of Rights, he counseled:
In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you omit one which
has great weight with me; the legal check which it puts into the hands of
the judiciary. This is a body, which, if. rendered independent and kept
strictly to their own department, merits great confidence for their learning
and integrity. In fact, what degree of confidence would be too much, for
a body composed of such men as Wythe, Blair and Pendleton?1S
It seems clear that the "legal check" here contemplated was the exact equivalent inpurpose and desiredeffect of the "legal obstacle" that he had mentioned
in conjunction with the Virginia constitution; namely, a device to enforce
the principle that the legislature "shall not have power to infringe this constitution... ." After all, in the 1787 letter to Madison, Jefferson refers to the
council-of-revision type of veto and the separate judicial veto as though he
deemed them equally desirable alternativesas checks upon legislative abuse.
It may well be that, given a choice, Jefferson would have preferred the former
-as his draft proposal of a constitution for the State of Virginia suggests.
But with respect to the federal constitution he had little choice. It came
to him largely as a fait accompli, and plainly there was far more likelihood
of finding in it a judicial veto than a council of revision.
12 Letter to Madison, Dec. 20, 1787, 6 id. at 385, 387. Emphasis added to those words
which Mr. Krislov appears to have overlooked--overlooking them results in a distorted
understanding of the letter, and'a gratuitous mistake about an "overnight" change of mind.
Krislov, supra note 4, at 119, 122.
13 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
14 Mr. Krislov asserts that Jefferson had not read the Federalistcarefully, supranote 4, at
122. Jefferson wrote, "I read it with care, pleasure and improvement ... " Letter to Madison, Nov. 18, 1788, 7 TiE WRPINGS OF THOMAS JEFFErsON 183 (Bergh ed. 1904).
15 Letter to Madison, March 15, 1789, 7 id. at 309. Speaking of an exchange of thoughts
that culminated in this letter, Irving Brant said, "Thus it was through Jefferson that Madison
was brought to the doctrine of judicial review, and it was from Madison that Jefferson derived the idea (but not the details) of the Kentucky Resolutions." 3 JAmmS MADISON: FATHER oF =H CONSrIuTiON 267 (1950).
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It is suggested that the "legal check" which Jefferson had in mind at this
juncture was nothing more than concurrent review. But the latter means
merely that while the judiciary may construe the Constitution in matters
that come before it, such constructions are not binding upon other branches
of government. In short the legislature is its own independent judge of the
validity of its own conduct. This was precisely the defect of the Virginia
constitution against which Jefferson had fought-the defect he proposed
to cure by a super-legislative provision that the "General Assembly shall not
have power to infringe this constitution ... ."16 (This provision of course
was to be enforced by an outside"legal obstacle.") Similarly concurrent review
does not seem to jibe with either the "conjoint" negative, or the "negative...
invested separately" in the judiciary, one or the other of which Jefferson
felt should have been in the federal constitution as a device for overriding
Congress. 17 Nor does concurrent review sound like an argument of such
"great weight" that Jefferson would suggest Madison should use it in support of the proposed Bill of Rights18 If Madison had argued concurrent
review publicly and been questioned on the point, he would have had to.
admit that it would have no binding effect upon Congress, the executive,
or any other agency of government (including the states?)--that, whatever
the Supreme Court might hold, no other branch of government would be
under any legal or moral obligation to follow anything but its own conception
of the limits of its own power. For example, the Court might hold a particular
established church unconstitutional, nevertheless it would be perfectly legal
for Congress and the executive to maintain the establishment. I suggest that
this was not the "weighty argument" that Jefferson thought should be used
in support of the Bill of Rights-but rather that he had in mind the kind of
argument he himself had used with respect to the need for a "legal obstacle"
to restrain the Virginia legislature from violating state constitutional limitations.

Having suggested that Jefferson believed in judicial review (or something
quite similar) prior to 1800, and that he abandoned it in favor of concurrent
review thereafter, I must now attempt to account for the change. My position
like Dumas Malone's, comes to this: Jefferson's means changed in the face
of changing circumstances; his ends remained constant. When in the beginning
"the danger of judicial supremacy seemed exceedingly remote," when Congress seemed dangerous and the federal judiciary the most "harmless" branch
of government, 19 a beefing-up of judicial power would promote balanced
government. Later, when in Jefferson's view judicial supremacy became a
16 Jefferson's Draft of a Constitution for Virginia (1783), 6 THE PAuRs or THoaAs
JEmsoiN 294,298 (Boyd ed. 1952).
17

See text at note 12 s ra.
IsSee text at note 15 supra.
19 See text at notes 21 & 23 infra.
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reality, a reduction of court power would promote balance. If he was flexible
as to means, Jefferson's "deeper consistency lay in his continued advocacy
20
of a balanced government."
In the same 1789 letter to Madison in which he expressed "great confidence"
in a properly organized judiciary, Jefferson observed that: "The executive,
in our governments, is not the sole, it is scarcely the principal object of my
jealousy. The tyranny of the legislatures is the most formidable dread at
present, and will be for many years. That of the executive will come in its
turn; but it will be at a remote period." 2 1 Since, as he saw it then, the danger
lay in the legislature and the executive, he would naturally look for protection
in other quarters. He found it not only in a "legal check" (as we have seen),
but also in state check: "The jealousy of the subordinate governments is
a precious reliance." 22 This of course found expression later in the Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions. The point is that Jefferson's attention prior to
1800 was oriented toward Congress and the executive as the dangerous
branches of government. It cannot be said that he was thinking only of the
moment, for he observed that while the one was immediately dangerous, the
other would be a threat later. Yet he fc;resaw no trouble from the judiciary.
Later he recognized his error:
At the establishment of our constitutions, the judiciary bodies were supposed to be the most helpless and harmless members of the government.
Experience, however, soon showed in what way they were to become the
most dangerous; that the insufficiency of the means provided for their
23
removal gave them a freehold and irresponsibility in office.
What had happened in the interval between these two letters that changed
Jefferson's mind about the relative danger of the courts and the other branches
of government is plain. The Federalists had adopted the Alien and Sedition
Acts (1798) in an effort to defeat Jefferson's Republican Party. Federalist
judges had enforced the sedition provisions viciously. Wh6n these moves had
failed to secure the great election of 1800 for the Federalist Party, it used
its last days in office to expand and pack the federal bench (1801). As Jefferson
saw it, the Federalists:
have retired into the judiciary as a stronghold. There the remains of
federalism are to be preserved and fed from the treasury, and from that
battery all the works of republicanism are to be beaten down and erased.
By a fradulent use of the Constitution, which has made judges irremovable,
24
they have multiplied useless judges merely to strengthen their phalanx.
op. cit. supra note 3, at 163.
Letter to Madison, supranote 15, at 312.
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22Id.at
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311.
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(Washington ed. 1854).
24 Letter to Dickinson, Dec. 19, 1801, 10 THE WRITINGS
(Bergh ed. 1904).
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These fears of an overriding judiciary were confirmed some two years later
in Marbury v. Madison.25 The Jeffersonians had defeated their Federalist rivals in the political arena-only to find them entrenched in the judiciary
with the formidable power of judicial review. Under such circumstances,
perhaps, a Jeffersonian change in attitude as to the extent of judicial power
is not quite the "needless and redundant" change in principle "at a moment
26
of triumph" that Mr. Krislov has suggested.
I do not find that Jefferson ever formulated the doctrine of concurrent
review prior to 1801, i.e., prior to his discovery that the judicial lamb had
become in fact a wolf. As late as September, 1798, he wrote to a friend that
despite the "alarm and jealousy" then sweeping the country "the laws
of the land, administered by upright judges, would protect you from any
exercise of power unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States." 27
Is it likely that Jefferson would have spoken thus of "unauthorized" power,
if at that time he believed at least three agencies had the power-independently
and concurrently-to determine what was authorized and what was not?
Concurrent review may have been, an afterthought inspired by the Federalist threat to destroy Jeffersonianism from a stronghold in the judiciary. The
most immediate difficulty from the Jeffersonian point of view was that
Federalist judges, including some Supreme Court Justices on Circuit, abused
28
the Bill of Rights by abetting persecution in a series of Sedition Act cases.
The judiciary having failed to provide the "legal check," Jefferson (with
Madison) turned to his second line of defense (the state check) in the Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions (1798-1799). When this also failed, and after
he became President, he may have hit upon concurrent review. In any case
what seems to have been his first enunciation of that doctrine appeared in the
draft of a message to Congress (December, 1801). But, for whatever reason,
it was deleted before delivery. 29
It is noteworthy that in the context of the Sedition Act convictions concurrent review is not entirely unlike political supremacy. If the courts had
gone along with Jefferson's understanding of the Bill of Rights, well and
good. When they failed to do so concurrent review provided the rationale
for a "final" check via the executive pardoning power and the legislative
power to repay fines. It may be significant that in what appears to be Jefferson's first "published" exposition of the doctrine (the year after Marbury
v. Madison), he illustrated his point by reference to the Sedition Act prosecutions:
25 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

26 Krislov, supra note 4, at 123.
27 Letter to Rowan, Sept. 26, 1798, 10 To WiriNms OF T-OMAs JEFFERsON 59, 61

(Bergh ed. 1904).
28 See Swmsa,

AMmCAN CoNsrnmoNAL DEvELoPwzEr 88-98 (1954).

29 1 WARREN, THE SUPREbE COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY

265-66 (1935).
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nothing in the Constitution has given [the judges] a right to decide for
the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for them. Both magistrates are equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to them.
The judges, beheing the [Sedition] law constitutional, had a right to pass
a sentence of fine and imprisonment: because the power was placed in their
hands by the Constitution. But the Executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, were [sic] bound to remit the execution of it; because that
power has been confided to them [sic] by the Constitution.30
As a matter of fact, President Jefferson did pardon all who had been convicted
and stopped all pending Sedition Act prosecutions. Siilarly, Congress
did in fact repay the fines that had been im'osed. It is crucial that Jefferson
says he exercised the pardoning power not on grounds of mercy or new evidence, but on constitutional grounds. Yet in the end he was not completely
sure that even concurrent review by judges was desirable. Thus, in 1815
he observed that: "another opinion entertained by some men of suchjudgment
and information as to lessen my confidence in my own.... [holds] thai
the legislature alone is the exclusive expounder of the sense of the Constitution, in every part of it whatever."31
Mr. Krislov tries to explain the absence of a "precise statement of concurrent review prior to 1801" with the assertion that "comment on construction of written, superior constitutions was academic prior to 1789. ... "32
In fact there was considerable non-academic discussion of that problem.
"For the period between ca. 1778 and 1789, evidence of the evolving theory
or practice of reviewing legislation against a constitutional standard is available with regard, inter alia, to Virginia, Rhode Island, the Carolinas, New
York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey." 33 Indeed, Jefferson's
Notes on Virginia (1782) were in part one side of a debate on the issue of
whether the Virginia constitution of 1776 was a "written, superior constitution" or merely a legislative act.34 The other side of the debate is reflected
in Commonwealth v. Caton,35 in which seven of the eight judges of Virginia's
highest court "were of opinion, that [they] had power to declare any resolution
or act of the legislature, or of either branch of it, to be unconstitutional
and void ... "36 Jefferson's position, of course, was completely sympathetic
in principle; his point being merely that, since the 1776 constitution was only
an ordinary statute, it offered no real "legal obstacle" to legislative tyranny.
30 Letter to Mrs. John Adams, Sept. 11, 1804, 11 THE NVt-ri.NGs oF THOMAS JEFFERSON
49, 50-51 (Bergh ed. 1904).
31 Letter to Torrance, 14 id. at 302, 305.
32 Krislov, supra note 4, at 119, 120.
33 DowIIG, CAsEs o.4 Co.snTn'-IOAL LAw 70 (5th ed. 1954). See also HAI.-Es, THm
AmcRAN DocrRiNE oF JtDrcIAL SUPESmAcy ch. 5 (1932).
34 See text at notes 6 and 7 supra.
35 8 Va. (4 Call.) 5 (1782).
36 Id. at 20.
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Accordingly, as we have seen, he advocated a "written, superior constitution"
that would remove all doubt as to whether or not there were effective limitations on legislative authority.
It was in Commonwealth v. Caton that Jefferson's great legal hero, Judge
Wythe, proclaimed: "[I]f the whole legislature... should overleap the bounds
prescribed to them by the people, I ...will meet the united powers, at my
seat in this tribunal; and, pointing to the Constitution, will say, to them,
37
here is the limit of your authority; and, hither, shall you go, but no further."
It is difficult to believe that, if in this era the articulate Jefferson favored
concurrent review, he could in view of Caton use the term "legal check"
without explaining that he meant concurrent, rather than judicial, review.
Indeed, an explanation would seem especially necessary in a letter to a fellow
Virginia specialist in constitutional law. Yet this is precisely the term he used
simpliciterin writing to Madison that "In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you omit one which has great weight with me; the legal check
which it puts into the hands of the judiciary." 38 The point need not be put
on such narrow grounds. Is it likely that Jefferson would use in a special,
unexplained sense a term which so naturally described a doctrine that had
been spelled out in the Federalist and in the "evolving theory or practice"
of most states-to say nothing of Dr. Bonham's Case,3 9 colonial experience
with the Privy Council,40 Otis' famous argument against Writs of Assistance,
and Jefferson's own letter of 1786 in which he seemed to consider judicial
4
review as a generally accepted principle. 1
Even Mr. Krislov has not been able to find any Jeffersonian enunciation
of the doctrine of concurrent review to which the term "legal check" in the
1789 letter may have been a shorthand reference. Insisting that Jefferson
favored concurrent review throughout his career, Mr. Krislov offers nothing
but a "presage" of that doctrine prior to 1801.42 This he purports to find
in a letter of June 20, 1787, in which Jefferson urged qualified judicial, as opposed to exclusive congressional, control over state legislation in the interest
of national supremacy:
the plaintiff urges the Confederation, and the treaty made under that, as
controlling the State law; the [state] judges are weak enough to decide
according to-the views of their legislature. An appeal to a federal court sets
all to rights. It will be said, that this court may encroach on the jurisdiction
of the State courts. It may. But there will be a power, to wit, Congress,
43
to watch and restrain them.
37 Id. at 8.
38 Letter to Madison, supra note 15, at 309.

39 8 Coke Reports 114a, 118a (1610).
40 See, e.g., HAsNES, op. cit. supra note 33, at ch. 3.
41 Ibid. See text at note 11 supa.
42
Krislov, supra note 4, at 120, 121.
43

Letter to Madison, June 20, 1787, 6 THE WRIT NGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 131, 133

(Bergh ed. 1904).
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I suggest that this is no evidence of even a "presage" of concurrent review.
The essence of the latter is that the agency reviewed is not bound by the
review, but being "truly independent ...has an equal right to decide for
itself what is the meaning of the Constitution in the cases submitted to its
action...." 44 Obviously in the letter in question Jefferson did not even
vaguely contemplate any such concurrent authority for the states. Similarly
the suggested relationship between Congress and the federal judiciary is a vertical or appellate, not a concurrent, relationship. It leaves no possibility of two
or more competing interpretations of the same constitutional provision
(which is the vice of concurrent review). As though recognizing the weakness
of his own position on this point, Mr. Krislov slides away from it by concluding that in any case "the one concept [that Jefferson's proposal] ... is clearly
inconsistent with is the notion of an inherent and unique power of judicial
interpretation." 45 This thrust is wide of the mark; no one has claimed that
Jefferson believed in an "inherent and unique power of judicial interpretation." 46 What has been suggested is that prior to 1800 Jefferson believed
in judicial review. Moreover the review of state legislation that he here proposed is remarkably like that recognizedin Pennsylvaniav. Wheeling &Belmont
Bridge Co., 47 and more recently in Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Benjamin.48
If what these cases and Jefferson suggest constitutes a modified judicial
review, it relates only to state measures. It has no bearing on Jefferson's
conception of the "legal check" upon national acts except to suggest that
in the early periodJefferson wantedfinal authoritative,rather than concurrent,
interpretationsof the Constitution.
The only other purported hint of concurrent review that Mr. Krislov has
been able to find prior to 1801 is Jefferson's statement that: "The negative
of the President is the shield provided by the Constitution to protect against
the invasions of the legislature: 1.The right of the Executive. 2. Of the Judiciary. 3. Of the States .... ."49 Of course the presidential veto may protect the
states, the executive and the judiciary. If that converts judicial review into concurrent review, we have never had judicial review in this country. "It would
seem," Mr. Krislov says, "that under exclusive review the judiciary would
haae been well able to take care of itself in the realm of constitutional interpretation." 50 His point apparently is that Jefferson would not have men44 Letter to Judge Roane, supra note 5, at 214.
45 Krislov, supra note 4, at 121.
46 If Jefferson thought any agency had an "inherent and unique power" of interpretation,
presumably it would be the states. See discussion below with respect to the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolution.
47 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856).
48 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
49
Opinion Against the Constitutionality of a National Bank, 3 THE WRrrINGS oF THOMAs
JEFFERSON 145, 152 (Bergh ed. 1904).
5
0 Krislov, supra note 4, at 121.
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tioned presidential protection of the judiciary, if he had thought the courts had
their own, more effective, power of judicial review to protect themselves. The
answer is that few, if any, advocates of judicial review have ever suggested that
it and the presidential veto are mutually exclusive, incompatible, or that either
makes the other superfluous. One difference between them is that the veto
gives its protection ab initio; judicial review cannot protect anything until
after a case arises-and there is no guarantee that one will arise. The short of
it is that the presidential veto and judicial review have existed side by side since
Marbury v. Madison.
As suggested above, when Jefferson in the early period found legislatures
and executives the chief source of danger, he would naturally seek protection
in other quarters-namely, in a "legal check" and a state check. Mr. Krislov
finds it "difficult to imagine why the judiciary should be granted exclusive
power vis-h-vis the other two branches, yet share constitutional interpretation
with the states." 51 Let Madison enlighten him:
However true, therefore, it may be that the judicial department is, in all
questions submitted to it by the forms of the Constitution, to decide in the
last resort, this resort must necessarily be deemed the last in relation to
the authorities of the other Departments of the [national] Government; not
in relation to the rights of the parties to the constitutional compact [i.e. the
states], from which the judicial as well as the other departments hold their

delegated

trusts.s2

In this passage, of course, Madison was explaining the theory of the Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions; namely, that the states, as "the sovereign parties
to the Constitution," must have the ultimate power of interpretation as an
extraordinary safeguard against a failure in the regular, internal check and
balance system.
Finally Mr. Krislov says that my "argument boils down to the hypothesis
that Jefferson concocted concurrent review in order to explain his pardoning
of the victims of the Alien and Sedition Acts."53 Apparently as Mr. Krislow
indicates, Jefferson needed no excuse for the exercise of a clearly granted
power in a "highly popular" cause. Why, then, did he go out of his way to give
the elaborate and "unnecessary" explanation? Presumably because he was
using the happy occasion as a vehicle to launch a new doctrine for future use
in cases that might not be so clear, or so popular.
Mr. Krislov's original article5A questions the evidence that Jefferson favored
judicialreview prior to 1800, and clearly established that he favored concurrent
review thereafter. But this is no substitute for affirmative evidence of what
Jefferson stood for in the earlier period. Later,55 as though recognizing this
s Id. at 120.
52 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CoqS'TTuTioN 549-50 (1836).
5
3 Krislov, supra note 4, at 123..
54 Krislov, Jefferson on JudicialReview, 9 J. PuB. L. 374 (1960).
5
5 Krislov, The Alleged Inconsistency, 10 J. PuB. L. 117, 120-21 (1961).
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Iifficulty, Mr. Krislov offered the two "presages" discussed above--one of
which. I suggest, entails no element of concurrenc-.. vhatsoe,,er: the other
is simply a statement by Jefferson that the presidential veto is a "shield"
to protect other agencies from congressional abuse ( uch a shield. of course.
Is completely compatible with judicial review; indeed, the two have lived
side by side for more than a century and a half).
if my own evidence of what Jefferson thought in the early period falls
short of conclusive proof, may we in the face of it assone that his "great
silence" with respect to concurrent review prior to 1801 even presaged that
doctrine? What a coincidence that, after years of constitutional discussion,
Jefferson expounded concurrent review only after courts had replaced legislatures as "the great object of [his] fear. .. ."--and only after his first defenses
(the "'legal check" and the state check) had failed. Above all, how convenient
,o have thought of it (if such was the case) just as he came into control of the
.eeislative and executive branches-when his opponents had retired into the
judiciary as a battery of opposition to all that Jefferson cherished.

